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Abstract: In the context of a monetary union, to keep a territorial equilibrium in terms of economic 
activity and employment, the relationship between real wages and productivity is crucial. In this 
paper, empirical evidence about the response of wages to productivity is obtained for 20 OECD 
countries and the role of labour market institutions to explain differences in this response is 
analysed. 
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WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY: THE ROLE OF LABOUR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS IN OECD COUNTRIES 
 
I. Introduction and objectives 
 
Surely, the common place of last years’ economic literature is that the European Monetary Union 
will modify deeply the main mechanisms of the European Economy. In fact, still in 1990, “One 
Market, One Money” (European Commission, 1990) pointed out the advantages and disadvantages 
of introducing a single currency. Apart from the microeconomic advantages highlighted there -
suppression of transaction costs, reduction of information costs and uncertainty -, the vast literature 
on macroeconomic real convergence points out the important role of external aperture (Edwards, 
1993), price stability (Landau, 1986) and the reduced relevance of public consumption (Landau, 
1983) as the main conditioning factors of relative income levels to converge. The increasing 
integration caused by the existence of a single currency, the higher price stability achieved by an 
independent European Central Bank (ECB) and the resizing of the public sector after the Stability 
Pact, is expected to create the conditions for a higher growth and a higher long-run real 
convergence level, whose effects on employment would be necessarily positive. 
 
Concerning the disadvantages, the lost of competence in terms of nominal exchange rates, the 
centralisation of monetary policy, and the scarce possibilities to act using fiscal policies limit the 
capacity of countries to react against recessive asymmetric shocks. A part of the existing literature 
has questioned the relevance of these shocks due to the high importance of intra-industry trade 
among European Union countries (European Commission, 1990). However, the opposite can be 
found in several empirical studies. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992), using structural VAR models, 
first proposed and applied by Blanchard and Quah (1989), detect a high cyclic asymmetry between 
a Central European core and the Atlantic and Mediterranean periphery. Also, Decressin and Fatás 
(1995) relate a greater proportion of dynamics in European employment growth to region-specific 
factors than in the United States, deducing that the creation of the Monetary Union will generate a 
higher degree of regional specialization and, as a result, a higher probability of asymmetric shocks. 
In fact, an important asymmetric behaviour of regional output has been detected in Europe in recent 
times (De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke, 1991 and De Nardis et al., 1996). 
 
The presence of specific shocks in the past and their future probability highlight the importance of 
adjustment mechanisms to these shocks. Following Mundell (1961) and later works on optimum 
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currency areas (Kenen, 1969), there are three possible adjustment mechanisms: factor mobility, 
fiscal transfers and wage flexibility. 
 
As capital is already highly mobile, factor mobility is mainly concerned with the possibility of 
labour factor emigrating from these regions towards those not affected by the perturbation. 
Available studies usually detect a low mobility of the labour force among the European regions, 
both at a national level (Padoa Schioppa, 1991) and Europe as a whole (European Commission, 
1990; De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke, 1991; Decressin and Fatás, 1995; among others). However, 
the inter-territorial equilibrium and the social cohesion (and even the maintaining of the 
environment and political coexistence) advise against a high mobility in Europe.  
 
A second adjustment mechanism to regional shocks is related to fiscal transfers from central budget 
to regions in recession. Optimum currency areas literature has pointed out the theoretical 
importance of fiscal transfers, and also the available empirical evidence has highlighted their 
quantitative importance and their relevance, mainly for the United States (Sala i Martin and Sachs, 
1992; Bayoumi and Masson, 1995). In fact, the lack of this fiscal mechanism of regional 
stabilisation in the EU has enabled different authors to predict obstacles to the performance of the 
European economy. However, a high flexibility to adjust labour costs and productivity could 
facilitate regional competitiveness and employment without the costs of labour mobility. 
 
The analysis of regional developments has shown that, in the case of the United States, asymmetric 
shocks cause permanent effects on employment and temporal reductions of labour force 
participation and wages, together with a transitory increase of unemployment, being migration the 
main adjustment mechanism from the first year on (Blanchard and Katz, 1992). On the contrary, in 
Europe the main adjustment mechanism refers to a decline in labour force participation and a rise in 
unemployment, while migrations start three years after the shock (Decressin and Fatás, 1995). 
 
The work of Creel (1994) detects a relatively higher mobility, especially for German regions, with 
Spain in an intermediate position and Italy in the lowest. However, a similar analysis limited to the 
Spanish case (Jimeno and Bentolila, 1995) highlights the low regional mobility as an explanatory 
factor for the strong response of unemployment to regional shocks, which represents a third part of 
the impact, even after three years. 
 
Moreover, the economic implications of adopting the fiscal objective of zero budget balance in the 
medium term (as required by the Stability and Growth Pact –SGP-) for the different countries of the 
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Euro area implies that with a given interest rate and a fixed nominal exchange rate again the 
adjustment mechanism comes down to the prescription of “wage flexibility” (see Allsop and Artis, 
2003).  
 
As pointed out by Pissarides (2003), labour market flexibility has been discussed widely and most 
empirical studies that have focused in the analysis of the elasticity of wages to unemployment in a 
macroeconomic context. However, in this paper we consider a different concept of labour market 
flexibility: the elasticity of wages to productivity. From our point of view, this concept is also 
relevant to describe and understand how labour markets function and it has not been explicitly 
considered in the literature. At the competitive equilibrium, real wages should be equal to labour 
productivity. Although this rule will support a stable employment level, it is not sufficient to 
improve the chances of the unemployed to find work. In order to reduce unemployment, nominal 
wages have to increase by less than the sum of price inflation and productivity growth. Excess wage 
increases can contribute to a rise in inflation or a slowdown in employment growth, or both. 
 
The relationship between wages and productivity is even more relevant in the context of a Monetary 
Union as it is expected that market competition and the introduction of the euro could remove wage 
differentials between European countries without taking into account the evolution of productivity 
differentials (see Calmfors, 1998). However, other factors can also influence wages at the national 
level such as the extent of centralized wage bargaining between unions and employers. The 
experience of the United States shows that, in a first stage, unions tried to reduce geographical wage 
differentials. Only the pressure of external competitors has changed this trend towards a higher 
wage differentiation. In the case of Germany reunification, the trend has been similar (Reder and 
Ulman, 1993). However, the European case could be different, as recent contributions have pointed 
out the role of labour market institutions to explain the different response of wages to shocks in the 
United States and European countries (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000 and Bertola et al., 2001). For 
the case of the wage-productivity relationship, the only work to our knowledge that has considered 
the role of institutions is Millea (2002). She finds that the interrelationships between wages and 
productivity vary across several industrialized countries and that institutional differences explain 
part of these differences. In particular, country differences are related to the extent of bargaining 
coverage and the generosity of unemployment benefits. 
 
Taking this into account, the objective of this paper is twofold: first, to obtain a quantitative 
measure of the reaction of wages to productivity in a sample of countries formed by the old 
European Union members and other OECD countries; and, second, to extent the previous research 
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in the literature about the role of different labour markets institutions as a mechanism to limit wage 
increases to productivity gains in these countries. With this aim, wage equations are estimated in 
order to quantify the responses of wages to productivity and, in a second stage, these responses are 
related to labour market characteristics in the different considered countries. The following section 
provides empirical evidence on the relationship between wages and productivity and the role of 
institutions to explain country differences and, next, the paper concludes summarising the main 
findings and policy implications. 
 
II. Empirical evidence on the relationship between wages and productivity and the role of 
labour market institutions 
 
According to different wage determination theories, the evolution of wages is not only influenced 
by productivity but also influenced by other factors, such as inflation and unemployment. As 
Broersma and Den Butter (2002) highlight, traditional empirical studies on wage formation consider 
different variables (inflation, unemployment, productivity) to explain the determinants of the 
change in the wage rate (Phillips curve specification) or to explain the wage level (wage curve 
specification). While the Phillips curve specification is based on the theoretical model of Phelps 
(1968), where wages are set by firms, in the wage curve approach, wages are the outcome of a 
bargaining process between firms and unions. From a theoretical perspective, nowadays there is 
some preference among economists to use a wage curve specification rather than the Phillips curve. 
However, some recent works such as Hsing (2001) or European Commission (2003) prefer to use a 
Phillips curve specification.  
 
In order to obtain a quantitative measure of the reaction of wages to productivity, these two 
specifications can be used a starting point: 
 
 The wage curve specification 
 
In the general static specification of the aggregate wage equation (Bell et al., 2002 or 
Broersma and Den Butter, 2002), the wage level of country i at time t is explained using the 
following expression: 
 
 tititieti uPRcUcPccW ti ,,3,210, )log()log()log()log( ,   (1) 
 
where  
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log(Wi,t) is the logarithm of the level of nominal wages in country i at time t,  
log(Pei,t) is the logarithm of the expected level of prices in country i at time t,  
log(PRi,t) is the logarithm of productivity in country i at time t,  
log(Ui,t) is the logarithm of the unemployment rate in country i at time t, and, 
ui,t is a random error term which is supposed to follow a normal distribution. 
 
In this equation, the estimates of c3 would approximate the effect on wages of changes in 
productivity, taking also into account the evolution of other economic factors in the different 
countries while the coefficient c2 informs about the reaction of wages due to an increase in 
unemployment (the usual way of analysing “wage flexibility”). The above equation can be 
augmented in several ways, depending on the data availability, by taking into account additional 
explanatory variables, which prove useful in explaining the wage behaviour. Among them, a usual 
variable in the literature is related to the market power of firms to translate cost increases to product 
prices and it is defined as the difference between the inflation rate and the GDP deflator growth 
rate. 
 
 The Phillips curve specification 
 
In the Phillips curve specification, the endogenous variable and the explanatory variables are 
similar to those in the wage curve specification, but both are included in differences instead 
of in levels (see, for example, European Commission, 2003). 
 
Both approaches, the wage curve approach as well as the Phillips-curve approach, have some 
obvious disadvantages: with respect to the wage curve, it is not clear what this equation really 
stands for. It neither is a structural equation nor is it a reduced form equation. Therefore, it is 
somewhat difficult to attribute the shock to the demand side or to the supply side of the labour 
market. With respect to the Phillips-curve, if the equation is estimated with a measure of expected 
inflation, it should be vertical in the long run; thus, there is no place for analyzing long-term effects 
using the expectation augmented Phillips curve. 
 
Whether measures of labour market flexibility are derived from level or first difference 
specifications is mainly an empirical question. However, it should be kept in mind that a level 
specification is often favourable from an economic point of view. In particular, the labour demand 
equation is obtained in levels from optimization behaviour of firms. In contrast, the first difference 
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specification could be only justified by statistical and econometric arguments. One possibility of 
taking into account the short run and long run relationships between the considered variables will be 
to specify error correction models for each of the considered countries. In order to analyse if this 
specification is appropriate, the time series properties of each variable should be analysed. Unit root 
tests can be conducted for individual countries or for a panel of countries. However, it has been 
widely acknowledged that standard unit root tests may have a low power against stationary 
alternatives in several cases (Campbell and Perron, 1991). As an alternative, recently developed 
panel unit root tests can be applied. Since the time series dimension is enhanced by the cross 
section, the results rely on a broader information set. Gains in power are thus expected, and more 
reliable evidence will be obtained.  
 
As previously mentioned, we have considered the following 20 countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the United States. Wages 
have been proxied by data on compensation per employee while the lagged level of prices has been 
used to proxy the expected level of prices as in Hsing (2001), among others and the Gross Domestic 
Product is expressed in real terms for the year 2000. Following the literature, the market power of 
firms to translate cost increases to product prices in the short term will be considered as an 
additional explanatory variable and it has been proxied by the difference between the inflation rate 
and the GDP deflator growth rate. Data from 1970 to 2004 for these variables have been obtained 
from the OECD National Accounts, the OECD Economic Main Indicators and the OECD Economic 
Outlook. 
 
Table 1 shows the results of computing different panel unit root tests to the considered data 
expressed in levels1. In particular, the Levin et al. (2002) test, the Im et al. (2003) test and Fisher 
type tests using ADF and PP tests (Maddala and Wu, 1999) have been computed. The results from 
the Levin et al. (2002) test do not permit to reject the null hypothesis of a common unit root process 
at the usual significance levels for all variables. The results from the Im et al. (2003) test are also 
very similar to the previous ones although now the null hypothesis assumes individual unit root 
processes. However, the conclusions from the Maddala and Wu (1999) panel ADF and PP tests are 
opposite to the previous ones in most cases. In this sense, the results from a simulation study by 
Hlouskova and Wagner (2005) show that the power of the Levin et al. (2002) is much better than 
the Im et al. (2003) or Maddala and Wu (1999).2 
 
TABLE 1 
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Taking these results into account, it seems that an error specification model will be appropriate to 
analyse the relationship between wages and productivity. In particular, the chosen specification will 
be the following: 
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In this equation, the estimates of c8 would approximate the long run relationship between wages and 
productivity (our measure of labour market flexibility), taking also into account the evolution of 
other economic factors in the different countries. In order to obtain these estimates, non-linear least 
squares have been applied and instrumental variables estimation procedures have also been 
considered to deal with the possible bidirectional relationship between wages and productivity. In 
particular, lagged values of the different explanatory variables have been used as instruments. 
Detailed results of the estimation procedure are shown in table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 
 
The explained proportion of the variance of wages is very high for all countries and the estimated 
coefficients have the expected sign and magnitude both for short and long run elasticities. As 
expected, the values of the adjustment parameter in the error correction model are negative and its 
values are below unity in all cases. As this parameter is significant, the long run relationship 
between the considered variables holds for all countries. The values of the Durbin-Watson statistics 
also reject the presence of first order autocorrelation in the residuals. The stability of the estimates 
has also been checked using sequential Chow tests and the CUSUM and CUSUM-Q residuals tests. 
 
The estimates for the short and long run elasticities of wages to prices are close to unity in most 
countries, although it is considerably higher in Switzerland, a country with highly coordinated 
collective bargaining. Country differences in this coefficient show that in the presence of a common 
negative supply shock, inflationary pressures would be of different intensities. 
 
Regarding the results for the coefficient associated to the unemployment rate, the obtained results 
are in line with the ones obtained by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), who found a negative 
relationship between unemployment and wages, but their empirical regularity of a value of the 
elasticity close to –0.1 is not found in our results. However, it is worth mentioning that the analysis 
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of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) is based in the use of micro data while here we are using 
macroeconomic data. 
 
Focusing on the estimates of the long run coefficient associated to productivity, we have found a 
positive and significant relationship between wages and productivity. The countries where the 
response of wages to productivity is higher are Greece, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland while the 
country with a lower response is France. The estimate of the elasticity for Greece is twice the 
estimate for France. However, what explains these differences in the response of wages to 
productivity? In other words, which factors can determine that wages evolution is in line with 
productivity? Modern theories of wage setting highlight the role of factors related to insiders 
bargaining power (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988) making firms to pay efficiency wages to their 
workers above the equilibrium level, even in competitive labour markets (Stiglitz, 1986; Weiss, 
1991) or the existence of implicit contracts (Azariadis and Stiglitz, 1983). However, efficiency 
wage or insiders premia are not directly observable, and the share of implicit contracts in actual 
contracts is hard to identify. Only indirect evidence can be obtained, as certain implications of the 
rules can be tested. Research on wage determination has therefore directed its interest towards the 
institutional settings of the economy in order to obtain better approximations to the actual wage 
bargaining processes (Checchi and Lucifora, 2002) 
 
In order to examine the institutional impact on wages, a set of variables has been developed in the 
literature, covering various aspects of the institutional set-up. In particular, the structure of wage 
determination and, especially, the role of trade unions are considered. The main sources with a 
higher coverage of the considered period are the Layard et al. (1991) institutional database and 
different works by the OECD. 
 
Trade unions are highly important in the structure of the wage bargaining process. Greater union 
power tends to raise wages above the competitive equilibrium, implying that the wage level may be 
too high compared to productivity growth. This effect may be boosted in countries with strict 
employment protection schemes and extensive measures in favour of the unemployed. Union power 
is reflected in both union membership (union density), and in the degree of coverage of unionised 
contracts, i.e. the extent to which salaried workers are subject to union-negotiated conditions.  
 
A further aspect of the wage setting process refers to bargaining co-ordination and centralisation. 
These variables focus on the level at which collective contracts are negotiated and formally set in 
the economy, either at firm, sector, regional or national level. Opening (opt-out) clauses or company 
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employment agreements allow firms to deviate from centralised agreements to the detriment of 
employees. For example, the bargaining parties might agree on downward pay variations. The use 
of these clauses (especially in Germany) introduces more decentralisation in the wage-finding 
process, although their adaptability is limited by the favourability principle - in general, deviations 
from collective contracts should be in favour of the employees.  
 
Tanking these into account, we have used the estimates of the elasticity of wages to productivity as 
the endogenous variable of a regression analysis where three different groups of explanatory 
variables have been considered (see table 3 for the exact definition and sources):  
 
 Labour market institutions: factors related to collective bargaining such as trade union 
density, the bargaining level, the coverage, the degree of coordination between unions and 
between firms, the synchronization, among others could explain the differences of the 
translation of productivity improvements to wages.  
 
 Economic factors such as the proportion of big and small firms in every country and the 
sectoral structure could also have influence on the intensity of the relationship between 
wages and productivity. 
 
 Other variables approximating the different technological levels of the different economies 
and the different capital endowments or capital intensities could have also influenced the 
considered endogenous variable. 
 
TABLE 3 
 
One aspect that should be considered in this second step of the analysis is the problem of generated 
regressors on the left hand side of the models relating the elasticity of wages to productivity to 
labour market institutions. Taking this into account, we have estimated the different models by 
weighted least squares using as weights the standard error of the estimates of the long-run elasticity 
of wages to productivity.  
 
Another issue that needs to be highlighted is the existence of collinearity. The high correlation of 
the institutional variables and the small number of observations could imply imprecise parameter 
estimates. For this reason, the number of explanatory variables in the different models has been 
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reduced to avoid problems derived from collinearity. Simplification starts from different points to 
get a robust picture. The preferred equations are shown in table 4.  
 
TABLE 4 
 
From these results3, we can conclude that the intensity of the relationship between wages and 
productivity is lower in countries with a lower union density and a higher coordination between 
firms in the collective bargaining process. On the contrary, other factors such as the bargaining 
coverage and a higher synchronization affect positively the response of wages to productivity. The 
bargaining level also matters and the results show that in countries with more decentralization in 
collective bargaining, the response of wages to productivity increases. Moreover, it is worth 
mentioning that not only institutions matters, in countries with a higher presence of small firms or 
higher levels of technology, productivity gains are more easily translated into wage increases. 
Summarising, the obtained results are in line with the predictions by wage determination theories 
and highlight the role of institutions in the functioning of the labour market.  
 
 
III. Final remarks 
 
It is expected that, after introducing the euro, wage differentials will shrink due to a 
“demonstration” or “fair wage” effect among other reasons. If this reduction is not in line with the 
evolution of productivity, competitiveness in some countries will be damaged and the exchange rate 
could not be used to restore it. 
 
Using a specification based in a Phillips curve augmented with expectations where long run and 
short run relationships are considered, a quantitative measure of the intensity of the relationship 
between wages and productivity is obtained. Differences in the reaction of wages to productivity 
increases are explained by some factors related to labour market institutions and with the bargaining 
power of trade unions such as, trade union density, the coverage, the level of collective bargaining, 
or the degree of firm coordination. 
 
In this context, there are some policy options that should be taken into account: the collective wage 
bargaining systems should be more decentralised, the level of collective bargaining should be closer 
to the firm and it should be possible to apply opt-outs at the regional or at the firm level. The idea is 
that workers, unions and firms should take into account regional, sectorial and firm conditions when 
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negotiating wages4. Although, it could be seen as “unfair”, wage divergence can have better long-
term economic effects than wage convergence. 
 
 
IV. Endnotes 
 
1 First differences were also considered but the results of the tests, which are available from 
the authors on request, rejected this hypothesis. 
 
2 Another conclusion from this study is that the panel stationarity tests of Hadri (2000) and 
Hadri and Larsson (2005) perform very poorly, being this the reason for not having 
considered them in this paper.  
 
3 When interpreting these results, it is important to take into account that the way the 
qualitative variables have been coded establishes a particular metric over the different 
categories that could affect the results. A possible solution would consist in using k-1 
dummy variables for the different k categories of each variable. However, the low number of 
degrees of freedom has made impossible to apply this solution. 
 
4 In line with the proposal of Davies and Hallet (2001) analysing the situation of German, 
Italian and Spanish regions. 
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VI. TABLES 
 
Table 1. Pool unit root tests of wages, prices, unemployment productivity and the market power variable 
 
Sample: 1970 2004 
21 cross-sections 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
4 lags included (but similar conclusion in most cases with lags 0 to 4) 
 Wages Expected Prices Unemployment Productivity Market power
Method Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob.
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)            
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -0.10 0.46 -1.30 0.10 -1.11 0.13 -0.12 0.75 -0.25 0.15 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)           
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -1.69 0.97 -2.32 0.08 -2.26 0.22 -1.55 0.99 -2.39 0.12 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 55.62 0.08 33.53 0.82 31.82 0.87 33.24 0.83 67.14 0.01 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 68.27 0.06 9.05 1.00 23.77 0.98 53.81 0.10 70.24 0.00 
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Table 2. Error correction models for the growth rate of compensation per employees 1972-2004 (continues) 
  Short run elasticities Long run elasticities   
 Intercept  expected prices  unemployment  productivity Market power Adjustment Expected prices Unemployment Productivity Adj. R2 DW 
Australia 0.01 0.85   -0.68 -0.15 0.80 -0.10 0.78 0.78 1.85 
 (2.76) (7.61)   (-1.94) (-1.82) (4.70) (-2.25) (3.57)   
Austria -0.00 1.72 -0.06  -0.84 -0.21 0.92 -0.04 0.82 0.81 1.92 
 (-0.40) (9.26) (-2.35)  (-2.46) (-3.65) (1.77) (-1.88) (5.86)   
Belgium 0.00 0.62 0.09 0.85  -0.19 0.86 -0.04 0.81 0.83 1.90 
 (1.57) (4.22) (3.91) (4.22)  (-2.61) (3.44) (-1.62) (5.34)   
Canada -0.01 1.35    -0.37 0.85 -0.10 0.79 0.81 1.82 
 (-1.86) (11.1)    (-5.75) (3.87) (-3.58) (5.38)   
Denmark -0.00 0.89 0.09 1.06 0.73 -0.41 0.92 -0.05 0.88 0.89 1.92 
 (-0.61) (12.4) (3.41) (3.82) (2.71) (-3.23) (9.01) (-4.11) (2.33)   
Finland 0.00 1.30 -0.04 0.30  -0.49 1.02 -0.06 0.87 0.90 1.99 
 (0.26) (10.1) (-2.28) (1.82)  (-6.01) (4.14) (-4.29) (8.97)   
France -0.01 1.08 -0.06 0.67  -0.15 0.83 -0.21 0.71 0.90 1.89 
 (-0.72) (8.75) (1.37) (1.99)  (-2.04) (2.44) (-3.63) (2.54)   
Germany -0.00 1.00  0.89 -0.50 -0.14 0.78 -0.05 0.82 0.89 1.82 
 (-0.73) (4.76)  (27.1) (-1.76) (-1.83) (1.96) (-2.29) (5.78)   
Greece -0.01 1.18  0.62 -0.66 -0.30 0.92 -0.15 1.50 0.60 1.84 
 (-0.36) (5.30)  (2.17) (-1.76) (-1.87) (1.98) (-1.82) (4.13)   
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Table 2. Error correction models for the growth rate of compensation per employees 1972-2004 (continuation) 
 Short run elasticities Long run elasticities   
 Intercept  expected prices  unemployment  productivity Market power Adjustment Expected prices Unemployment Productivity Adj. R2 DW 
Ireland 0.01 1.19 -0.06  0.19 -0.37 0.93 -0.01 0.78 0.88 1.98 
 (0.02) (12.8) (-1.73)  (1.11) (-4.09) (4.42) (-2.37) (13.34)   
Italy -0.02 1.44 -0.22  1.18 -0.30 0.99 -0.07 0.83 0.92 1.71 
 (-3.92) (18.7) (-4.90)  (7.02) (-5.75) (3.13) (-2.86) (15.66)   
Japan 0.01 1.36 -0.18   -0.59 0.98 -0.12 0.95 0.94 1.57 
 (5.66) (13.7) (-5.55)   (-6.22) (1.81) (-4.81) (25.44)   
Netherlands -0.00 1.67 -0.02 -0.63 -1.12 -0.37 0.81 -0.02 0.82 0.88 1.64 
 (-1.29) (8.52) (-1.39) (-2.23) (-4.07) (-4.87) (2.81) (-2.99) (8.15)   
Norway -0.00 1.22 -0.03  0.41 -0.49 0.89 -0.10 0.89 0.76 1.98 
 (-0.60) (8.71) (-1.54)  (1.46) (-4.38) (4.24) (-4.86) (16.73)   
Portugal 0.04 0.67 0.11 0.23 0.46 -0.44 0.97 -0.02 0.77 0.82 1.79 
 (4.91) (9.33) (2.05) (1.56) (2.04) (-4.32) (7.96) (-2.63) (3.56)   
Spain -0.00 1.13 -0.08 1.09  -0.18 1.00 -0.03 0.84 0.87 1.78 
 (-0.79) (8.36) (-1.93) (4.29)  (-1.96) (5.76) (-2.21) (3.82)   
Sweden 0.03 0.72 -0.04 -0.50  -0.21 0.98 -0.10 0.93 0.73 2.20 
 (4.07) (6.06) (-2.04) (-2.44)  (-2.99) (4.60) (-5.27) (15.03)   
Switzerland 0.00 1.24 -0.01   -0.33 1.12 -0.00 0.90 0.67 2.00 
 (0.68) (7.74) (-3.93)   (-3.21) (2.80) (-2.24) (30.35)   
United Kingdom 0.02 0.87  -0.50  -0.43 0.95 -0.02 0.85 0.91 1.76 
 (4.60) (10.1)  (-2.20)  (-5.02) (5.47) (-2.36) (8.64)   
United States 0.01 0.75 -0.03  0.74 -0.36 0.83 -0.02 0.86 0.75 1.98 
 (3.43) (12.2) (-2.54)  (4.78) (-3.91) (6.20) (-2.34) (11.55)   
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Table 3. Definition and sources for labour market characteristics 
Variable Definition Source 
UNION Trade union density: percentage OECD Employment Outlook (1997) 
COVERAGE Bargaining coverage: 3-more than 75% of workers affected, 2-between 25% and 50%, 1 –less than 25% Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) 
COORU Degree of unions coordination: 3-high, 2-middle, 1-low Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) 
COORF Degree of firms coordination: 3-high, 2-middle, 1-low Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) 
SYNCHRO Bargaining synchronization: 2-completely, 1-some, 0-not exist Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) 
BARGLEVEL Bargaining level: 0-central, 1-sectorial, 2-firm Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) 
SMALLF Small firms percentage OECD Employment Outlook (1997) 
TECH National patent applications in 1992: Germany=100 OECD, Statistical Compendium. 
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Table 4. Explanatory factors of the estimates of the elasticity of wages to productivity 
 
Dependent Variable: Estimates of the elasticity of wages to productivity 
Method: Least Squares 
Weighting series: Standard error of the estimates of the elasticity of wages to productivity 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
C 0.69 2.39 0.83 3.32 0.79 2.62 0.45 1.58 0.41 4.23 0.03 0.17 
UNION -0.02 -2.86     -0.01 -1.00 -0.01 -1.99 -0.01 -1.56 
COVERAGE 0.43 7.01             
UNION*COORU   0.01 2.01           
COORF   -0.05 -2.78 -0.02 -1.61         
SYNCHRO     0.04 2.51         
BARGLEVEL       0.57 6.10 0.21 1.62 0.29 2.49 
SMALLF         0.01 3.61 0.01 5.16 
TECH              0.30 1.89 
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.39 0.41 
Observations 20 20 17 17 19 19 
 
 
